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he EU seems to be incapable of drawing the necessary lessons from the financial crisis. 
In its proposals on financial supervision, it is attempting to accommodate the demands of 
most member states, without implementing a truly integrated system of financial 
supervision. The core of its proposals for European supervision places a huge responsibility on 
the colleges of supervisors for cross-border banks, as if this model has not proven its complete 
inadequacy over the last few months. If Europe is serious about tackling the crisis and wants to 
be seen as such, it needs to make proposals for a European system of financial supervisors, not 
a network. This means empowering a strong centre which can, following the principle of 
subsidiarity, effectively and unequivocally act on behalf of the European interest and police 
national supervisory authorities. 
Now, almost two years into the worst financial crisis in Europe’s recent history, it seems that 
not much has changed. The proposals under discussion would basically upgrade the existing 
supervisory committees into three executive agencies of the European Commission, dealing 
with banking, insurance and securities markets. A fourth entity would be created under the aegis 
of the European Central Bank to monitor systemic risk. The creation of four different entities 
immediately poses problems of operational efficiency, information sharing and capacity to act. 
In addition, there is also the question about the supervision of firms that do not immediately fall 
within one of the four sectors, such as clearing and settlement operators, credit rating agencies, 
hedge funds, etc. Most importantly, the agencies would not have authority over the member 
states, but would help to execute EU policies. 
The discussion about the impossibility to subject European banks to stress tests just emphasises 
how urgent it is to upgrade the European structure, and how much time has been wasted in 
recent months. The debate in the US took place over several weeks, with the results published 
on May 6
th, including detailed information about the capital needs per bank. Meanwhile, 
following weeks of silence, the European banking supervisors announced on May 12
th that they 
were working on a stress test for the European banking sector. And when the European 
communiqué came, it was disappointing – rather than proposing a stress test, it merely offered a 
general financial stability assessment. The analysis per bank remains the responsibility of the 
national supervisors, the communiqué noted.  
This reaction to the financial crisis remains far too restrained, especially concerning action at 
the European level. Despite claims that banks were going European and that they would take the 
EU market as their home market, this prospect seems hardly to have materialised in the face of 
adversity. A European stress test cannot be performed, since there is no effective supervision at 
T European level, but only consolidated supervision according to the rules of the home country. 
Moreover, the definition of non-performing loans differs from one member state to another: in 
certain states, it is 3 months overdue, in others 6. And an off-balance sheet vehicle is 
consolidated in some member states, but not in others. Given such variations in norms, how can 
a European-wide stress test possibly be implemented?  
In the United States, contrary to the expectations of the European authorities, stress tests did not 
lead to more stress, the markets reacted positively to the increased transparency, confirming the 
adage of former US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis: “Sunlight is the best disinfectant.” 
Meanwhile, Europe muddles through, and has the audacity to publish a communiqué that it is 
carrying out a stress test, which it is not. What the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS) is doing is a macro financial stability assessment, and not a stress test. Individual stress 
tests are the responsibility of the home country, it was added, but the results will remain 
confidential. This condition would not change under the proposals put forward by the European 
Commission on May 27
th. 
If the IMF is asking Europe to carry out stress tests, it is repeating an old request. As early as 
June 2007, well before the financial crisis erupted, it asked the EU to improve the cooperation 
amongst supervisors and to upgrade the structure of supervision of market developments. Two 
years later, in the midst of the crisis, Europe is still struggling with the same question.  
The danger is not imaginary that the level of European market integration that had been 
achieved in recent years will recede, which will reduce the sustainability of European monetary 
policy. The enormous amounts of state aids funneled into the financial sector over the last 
months (about 25% of the EU GDP) has come only from national sources, not from European. 
The criteria that were set differed from country to country, but finally, the objective was the 
preservation of national financial stability, not European. Moreover, the differences between 
national plans create enormous distortions at European level. State aids allowed certain banks to 
expand their European activities, whereas competitors did not have access to the same funds. To 
increase control over national markets, it has been suggested that greater restrictions should be 
imposed on banks wishing to operate through branches and that preference should be given to 
separately capitalised subsidiaries, as recommended in the Turner Report. We are back in the 
pre-1992 era of European financial market regulation. 
It is thus extremely urgent to make progress towards a more European form of supervision. This 
should permit authorities to organise and publish stress tests from a European perspective, to 
allow those who kept the banks alive to judge whether the money was well spent. The 
concretisation of the de Larosière proposals is thereby crucially important, but the problem is 
that without a change of the EU Treaty, it is difficult to elaborate a European supervisory 
structure that stands above the member states and that can serve the European interest. 
 